Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1965

Article 9

6-1965

Business Associations--1964 Tennessee Survey
Daniel J. Gifford

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Gifford, Business Associations--1964 Tennessee Survey, 18 Vanderbilt Law Review 1069 (1965)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol18/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Business Associations-1964 Tennessee Survey
Daniel 1. Gifford*
In Denny v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment of the United States
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee which awarded $235,000 in
fees plus $6,227.98 in expenses to counsel representing minority stockholders
in a suit which had been brought to force cancellation of a purchase by
the Phillips & Buttorff Corp. from the instrumentalities of the controlling
stockholders of such corporation of 60,000 shares of stock in Win. R.
Moore Dry Goods Company for $2,700,000. The purchase of the Moore
stock had apparently been used as a means by which the controlling group
in the Phillips corporation had obtained corporate funds with
which to
2
finance their acquisition of a controlling amount of stock
Although the purchase of the Moore stock was rescinded before the
derivative action was tried, the court in a former opinion3 described the
purchase transaction as constructive fraud4 and ordered judgment to be
rendered on behalf of the corporation against the offending directors in an
amount equal to interest on the $2,700,000 purchase price from the
date of commencement of the action until recission. 5 The description, by
the court of appeals, of the stock purchase transaction as constructive
fraud is not readily reconcilable with an apparent finding of the district
court that the purchase price paid by the corporation for the Moore stock
was not unfair. The latter finding raises the questions of the extent to
which the corporation was harmed by the "constructive fraud" and the
extent to which the corporation was benefited by the rescission of the
constructively fraudulent transaction. Although the court of appeals, in
its former opinion, did not set aside the district court's finding as to value,
it did find prejudice to the corporation which resulted from the directors
"Stripping... [the corporation] of its cash and marketable securities and
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 331 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 831 (1964).
2. See the description of the transaction in Maggiore v. Bradford, 310 F.2d 519,
520 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 934 (1963). See also a discussion of such
transaction and of the Maggiore case in Covington, Business Associations-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. REv. 923, 925-27 (1964).
3. Maggiore v. Bradford, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 521. The court also stated that, "stripping P & B of its cash and
marketable securities so that the Comer Group could finance their controlling shares
certainly operated to the prejudice of P & B and its minority shareholders." Ibid.
5. Id. at 522. The rationale for awarding interest from the date of the commencement of suit could have been the treatment of the stock purchase as a
voidable transaction and the commencement of suit for recission as a disafrmance of
such voidable transaction and an offer to return the Moore stock. But see Dale v.
Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948), cited by the court
in connection with its interest computation.
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requiring it to borrow money so that the Comer Group could finance
their controlling shares ...."6

In the instant opinion the court felt that the large attorney's fees were

proper, despite the fact that the judgment for interest 7 on $2,700,000 from

the commencement of the action until rescission bore no relation to the
amount of the fees awarded, because the court felt the cancellation of the
stock purchase was the result of the commencement of the stockholder's
derivative action 8 The court felt that the cancellation of the stock purchase
"inured to the benefit of the corporation by restoring $2,700,000 in assets
in lieu of the Moore Stock,"9 but the opinion made no reference to the
worth of the Moore stock of which the corporation had possession between
the purchase and the recission.
6. See 310 F.2d at 521: "The District Judge . . . found that the price paid for
the Moore shares was not unfair or oppressive either to P & B or its minority shareholders."
7. Interest on the $2,700,000 was adjudged to be $40,800. See 331 F.2d at 250.
8. 331 F.2d at 251. The court stated with respect to the causal connection between
the bringing of the derivative action and the cancellation of the stock purchase that:
"It cannot be said that the cancellation of the purchase of the Moore stock did not result from the action of the minority stockholders." Ibid.; cf. Ripley v. International
Rys. of Cent. America, 16 App. Div. 2d 260, 264, 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, 69, aff'd, 12
N.Y.2d 814, 187 N.E.2d 131 (1962) ("Beneficial acts performed by the corporation
-if the result, in the whole or in substantial part, is attributable to the stockholders'
litigation-may be a valid base to claim compensation.").
9. In many derivative suits, fees have been awarded to plaintiff's counsel upon a
theory of a "benefit" received by the corporation through the efforts of such counsel.
See Grant v. Lookout Mt. Co., 93 Tenn. 691, 28 S.W. 90 (1894). Where the successful
plaintiff's counsel has prevented the dissipation of corporate property or where he has
obtained a monetary judgment in favor of the corporation, the economic benefit to the
corporation may be measurable. Accordingly, the corporate beneficiary of a measurable
economic benefit can be assessed a sum for the legal services expended on achieving
that benefit on a quasi-contractual theory. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 784, 789 (1939); cf. Whitsett v. City
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 3 Tenn. Ch. 526 (1877). In such instances, it is not uncommon for
a court to refer to the property obtained or recovered or protected as a "fund" out
of which counsel fees can be awarded. The presence of such a "fund," it will be
noted, can facilitate the fee award bearing a reasonable relation to the corporate
benefit received. E.g., Uffelman v. Boillin, 19 Tenn. App. 1, 43, 82 S.W.2d 545, 570
(M.S. 1935) (fee payable to successful counsel in stockholders' suit "out of the
aggregate recovery"). Compare Pennington v. Divney, 182 Tenn. 207, 185 S.W.2d
514 (1945) (applying a "benefit" rationale to fees awarded counsel of a creditor). But
see Hornstein, supra, at 799 n.100 (describing cases in %vhichfee awards exceeded
economic benefits to the corporation).
The relationship of the benefit to such a fund is absent in cases in which the efforts
of counsel for minority stockholders, although successful, has not resulted in a measurable economic benefit to the corporation. In such instances, however, some courts
have nonetheless awarded attorneys' fees on the ground that the corporation or a
class of stockholders was benefited, although not in economic terms. Richman v.
DeVal Aerodynamics, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 548, 185 A.2d 884 (1962); cf. Gilbert v. Local
701, Hoisting & Portable Eng., 237 Ore. 130, 384 P.2d 136 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 963 (1964); Note, 48 CAru. L. Bv. 843 (1960). To the extent that fees are
awarded where the corporate benefit is not economically measurable, the emphasis in
determining the size of the fees awarded may be based upon the effort of the attorney
and the value of his time. Nonetheless, those courts which, as a condition of awarding
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Although the amount of counsel fees approved in the instant case would
seem not excessive 10 if the corporation had benefitedioa by $2,700,000 an
appraisal of the benefit to the corporation based upon the difference between the purchase price recovered and the Moore stock surrendered
might make the amount of the counsel fees less easily justified. 11 The
court apparently felt that the financing of an acquisition of controlling
stock with corporate funds derived from a sale to the corporation of the
stock of another corporation is so inherently suspect that the counsel fees
awarded to minority stockholder counsel in voiding such a transaction ought
to be based not on a calculation of economic benefit to the corporation,

but upon a determination of the value of time and effort expended by
counsel reasonably related to securing the invalidation of such a transaction.
Why the minority stockholders should be forced to pay for legal services
in excess of the benefit to them was unexplained.
Davis v. Appalachian Electric Co-op.,12 determined that before members
attorney's fees, have insisted upon a benefit to the corporation which is "substantial"
in a meaningful sense may be retaining some notion of a relation between the
benefit received and the fees awarded. Richman v. DeVal Aerodynamics, Inc., supra,
cf. Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 253 Iowa 378, 111 N.W.2d 753 (1961); Bosch v. Meeker
Co-op. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
The benefit rationale of the awarding of fees has been re-enforced in some cases
with a rationale of preventing corporate wrongdoing. Fee awards, it is said, will discourage corporate managers from wrongdoing by making easier the bringing of corrective derivative suits. See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker Co-op. Light & Power Ass'n, supra.
To the extent that this policy rationale is intended to discourage breaches of trust by
controlling shareholders, as distinguished from discouraging law violations generally,
compare Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949), with
Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957), the attorney's fees awarded
ought not to be so large as to outweigh the benefits accruing to the corporation from
the suit. Cf. Eisenberg v. Central Zone Prop. Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 353, 149 N.Y.S.2d
840 (1956), aff'd mem., 3 N.Y.2d 729, 143 N.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884
(1957). Accord, Note, 45 Mn-. L. Bxv. 164, 167-68. (1960). But cf. Note, 13
STAN. L. Rv. 146 (1960).
10. Compare the counsel fee awards and their relation to the size of judgments
recovered by corporations presented in tabular form in Hornstein, New Aspects of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLum. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1947). See 13
FL-rcrnm, PnrvAr ConpoRAnoNS § 6045 (penn. ed. rev. 1961). Hornstein, Problems
of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 574, 587 (1942);
Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder Derivative Suits, supra, note 9, at
814; see also Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee
Awards, 69 HAIRv. L. REv. 658 (1956).
10a. In other situations related to attorneys' claims, the relevance of a benefit to the
client seems to vary. Thus an attorney's lien for his fees seems to be recognized only
when there has been an affrnative recovery and not when property has been merely
successfully defended. John Weis, Inc. v. Reid, 22 Tenn. App. 90, 118 S.W.2d 677
(M.S. 1938). Although when third persons are involved policy reasons partly explain
the foregoing distinction, cf. Garner v. Garner, 69 Tenn. 29 (1878), affirmative
"benefit" to a client seems to circumscribe the extent of the attorney's lien, while no
lien exists despite the actual benefit which results from the protection of valuable
property. On the other hand, the courts have expressly held that recovery of an
attorney's fee on a quantum meruit basis is not limited by the "benefit" of the
attorney's services to the client. Bills v. Polk, 72 Tenn. 494, 496 (1880).
11. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
12. 373 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1963).
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13
of an electric cooperative chartered under the Electric Cooperative Law
could maintain an action against the cooperative to compel the distribution of cooperative revenues in excess of the amounts authorized under
the Electric Cooperative Law to be retained, 14 the complaining members
must first exhaust their remedies within the cooperative. 15 It would appear
that the requirement of exhaustion was properly applied in the instant
case. Although the statute expressly commands the distribution of revenues in excess of amounts specifically authorized therein to be retained, 16
and to that extent in form removes the power of decision with respect to
revenue accumulation from the board of trustees,17 the statute both

13. Tm . CoDE ANN. §§ 65-2501 to -2533 (1955).
14. TErN. CODE Ar. § 65-2516 provides as follows:
"Refunds to members.-Revenues of a cooperative for any fiscal year, in excess of
the amount thereof necessary:
(A) To defray expenses of the cooperative and of the operation and maintenance of
its facilities during such fiscal year;
(B) To pay interest and principal obligations of the cooperative coming due in
such fiscal year;
(C) To finance, or to provide a reserve for the financing of, the construction or
acquisition by the cooperative of additional facilities to the extent determined by the
board of trustees;
(D) To provide a reasonable reserve for working capital;
(E) To provide a reserve for the payment of indebtedness of the cooperative maturing
more than one (1) year after the date of the incurrence of such indebtedness in an
amount not less than the total of the interest and principal payments in respect thereof
required to be made during the next following fiscal year; and
(F) To provide a fund for education in cooperation and for the dissemination of
information concerning the effective use of electric energy and other services made
available by the cooperative, shall be distributed by the cooperative to its members as,
and in the manner, provided in the by-laws, either (1) as patronage refunds prorated
in accordance with the patronage of the cooperative by the respective members paid
for during such fiscal year, or (2) by way of general rate reductions, or (3)
by combination of such methods. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the payment by a cooperative of all or any part of its indebtedness prior to the
date when the same shall become due."
It will be noted that although the quoted section is phrased in mandatory terms in
connection with the distribution of excess revenues, the section embodies trustee judgment in the determination of the amounts authorized to be retained, and thereby in the
determination of the amount of revenues which are in "excess" of the amounts authorized
to be retained.
15. The opinion of the court written by Justice White relied on a general practice
of courts in requiring exhaustion of corporate remedies before judicial remedies will
be invoked. In his concurring opinion, Justice Dyer set forth additional reasons for
requiring exhaustion in the instant case which were based upon provisions of the
Electric Cooperative Law and the bylaws of the cooperative. Of particular interest is
Justice Dyers invocation of § 65-2524 which permits 10% of the membership to place
a proposition before the entire membership at a special meeting. After invoking that
provision as a possible method by which the complainants in the instant case could
obtain a remedy within the cooperative, Justice Dyer then casts doubt on the availability
of such a remedy by expressly raising the possibility that the Legislature did not
intend the section to be invoked with respect to an issue such as the retention or
distribution of revenues. 373 S.W.2d at 455.
16. TFr . CoDE ANN. § 65-2516 (1955). See note 14 supra.
17. The possession of a power of decision has often been the rationale of the
exhaustion requirement. Especially in derivative suits where the directors have a power
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expressly 8 and by necessary implication 19 invokes the judgment and
discretion of the board of trustees in the determination of the amounts
which the statute authorizes to be retained. Thus, the statute expressly
vests the board with power to determine the sums required to be retained
for expansionO and impliedly vests the board with power to determine

the size of the working capital reserve,21 the indebtedness repayment

reserve, 2 and an information-dissemination reserve.23 Since the statute
necessarily assumes the exercise of the judgment of the board of trustees
in its application, the court would have been both unwise and in error to

have undertaken to decide what amounts should be distributed until the
trustees were notified of the complaint of the objecting members and were

given an opportunity to exercise that judgment. This opportunity might

satisfy the complaining members and end the litigation,24 or, especially if
the trustees state their reasons for failing to comply with the objecting
members' demands,2 5 as it would normally be desirable for the trustees
to decide whether the interests of the corporation would be furthered by suit, the
requirement of an initial demand upon the directors is designed to cause the directors
to exercise the power and discretion with which they have been invested. In cases
where the directors would not possess a disinterested judgment because of director
interest, the law usually excuses the suing stockholder from the initial demand upon
the director.
18. TN . CODE ANN. § 65-2516(C) (1955). In clause (C) the board is expressly
vested with discretion to determine the amounts to finance or reserve for the financing of
expansion.
19. TEN . CODE AN. § 65-2516(D),(E), & (F) (1955). Thus, the board would have
to determine what was a "reasonable" reserve for working capital under clause (D). The
board would have to determine the size of the reserve for repayment of indebtedness
under clause (E) where the statute governs only to the extent of declaring a minimum
reserve. Furthermore, in clause (F) the statute expressly authorizes repayment of
indebtedness prior to maturity and accordingly seems to vest the trustees with discretion to withhold profits for that purpose. The board would also apparently have
discretion to determine the size of the information dissemination fund authorized by
clause (F).

20.

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 65-2516(C) (1955).

21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2516 (1955). In its authorization of a "reasonable"
working capital reserve, the statute would seem to invoke the judgment of the board of
trustees at least in the first instance as to the determination of reasonableness. It is possible that the act might permit the by-laws to embody standards of reasonableness, however, and thus limit to some extent the scope for trustee judgment. Compare § 65-2509
(by-laws), with § 65-2510 providing that "the business and affairs of a cooperative shall
be managed by a board of.. . trustees." Cf. 373 S.W.2d at 454 (concurring opinion).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2516(E),(F) (1955). Clause (E) authorizes an indebtedness repayment reserve but contains no guidelines with respect to the size of such reserve
apart from establishing its minimum size, and clause (F) expressly permits repayment of indebtedness before maturity, thus re-emphasizing that the standard contained in clause (E) is merely a minimum standard.
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2516(F) (1955).
24. This is the traditional reason for requiring exhaustion in derivative suits. Compare
the analogous concept of exhaustion in administrative law.
25. Reasons are often helpful in evaluating the propriety of conduct. In many
areas of law conduct may be lawful if done for one reason, but unlawful if done for
a different reason. But see note 26 infra.
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to do, 26 it may serve to narrow the issues 27 with respect to the justification
for the retention of accumulated revenues.
The instant case does raise the broader question of the interrelation of
the courts to the internal activities of an electric cooperative and of
whether the relationship between the courts and business corporations
ought to be carried over to cooperatives for all purposes. 28 Of course,
courts are prone to decide cases by analogy, even when the analogy is
one of language or concept rather than underlying legislative purposes. 29
The court was silent with respect to whether the policies embodied in the
provisions of the Electric Cooperative Law distinguish institutions created

by that law from those created pursuant to the business corporation
statute by calling for a greater degree of judicial intervention on behalf
of the membership. Justice Dyer addressed himself somewhat more to
this point than did the opinion of the court, by pointing out various provisions of the Electric Cooperative Law which seem to suggest less rather
than more judicial intervention in the workings of an electric cooperative
because of the greater number and kind of internal remedies provided by
such an institution. 30 It is not clear, however, that the greater availability
of internal remedies may be but one facet of a legislative concern with a

high degree of protection for the membership, and, accordingly, judicial
intervention perhaps ought to occur whenever the court concludes that
such intervention would be necessary to correct a situation which internal
remedies in the particular situation are not well designed to correct.
Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the internal remedies provided
by statutes may be reduced in effectiveness by the determined opposition
31
of the board of trustees by making recommendations to the membership,
and by the distribution of literature to the membership justifying its own
26. Although it would be desirable to obtain the bases for the trustee's determination,
caution must be utilized in imposing a requirement of rational explanation on businessmen who may intuitively approach business decisions and yet are unable to articulate
their basis for decision. In such a case, the demonstrable invalidity of a businessman's
reasons might not necessarily indicate that the action he thereby sought to justify
was improper.
27. The issues might also be narrowed through the pleading and pre-trial process.
28. The opinion of the court seemed to assume that the present action ought to
be dealt with in the same way as if it involved a complaint by some stockholders
against a business corporation. Cf. F~r.-rcim, op. cit. supra note 10, § 8286.
29. Cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.).
30. Justice Dyer referred to § 65-2509 providing for membership control of by-laws.
That section provides that the "By-laws shall set forth the rights and duties of members and trustees and may contain other provisions for the regulation and management
of the affairs of the cooperative not inconsistent with this chapter or with the articles
of incorporation." Section 65-2509 apparently modifies to some extent the provisions
of § 65-2510 which vests management of the cooperatives "business and affairs" in
the board of trustees. Justice Dyer also referred to § 65-2514 providing for membership
meetings including provision for the initiation of membership meetings by 10% of the
members and to § 65-2524 providing for submission of propositions to vote of the
membership by petitions of 10% of such membership. But see note 4 supra.
31. Since each member has but one vote, under § 65-2514(G), the power of an
entrenched board may be difficult to challenge.
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position without distributing the literature of an opposition group. 32
In the case of In re Leeds Homes, Inc.,33 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in which the district court
had allowed, under chapter 10-4 of the Bankruptcy Act in the reorganization
of Leeds Homes, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, a claim as a secured
creditor,3- asserted by National Acceptance Company, a foreign corporation. The trustee in bankruptcy had opposed the claim on the ground
that the creditor foreign corporation had been doing business in Tennessee
without qualifying to do such business under Tennessee law, and that,
accordingly, under Tennessee law the claim of such corporation would
be barred under the policies embodied in sections 48-901 to -906 of the
Tennessee Code Annotated.
The court held that state and federal law were both relevant in deciding the question. The court stated that the state law was relevant
in determining whether or not an unqualified foreign corporation doing
business in Tennessee had a claim, and then held that if state law
acknowledged the existence of a claim-even if unenforceable 36-then
federal law 37 would be applied to determine whether that claim would
be allowed in the bankruptcy proceeding. The court then reviewed the
Tennessee decisions with respect to whether a contract entered into by
an unqualified foreign corporation was void or voidable and found the
language of such decisions inconsistent. It concluded, however, principally 8
32. In connection with the statutory provision for propositions initiated by petition
of 10% of the membership, the statute appears to require that "any document submitted with such petition to give effect to the proposition" shall be submitted to the
members at a special or annual meeting. TEN. CODE ANN. § 65-2524 (1955). It does
not require the distribution of such supporting document to the members prior to the
meeting. Since a quorum exists if 2% of the members are present, as stated in §
65-2514(F), most of the members may never see the documents distributed in connection with a proposition initiated by 10% of the membership. Furthermore, it seems
impossible for material distributed at a meeting to affect the thinking of a member
who is present only by proxy or who votes by mail. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-

2514(G) (1955).

33. 332 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1964), affirming 222 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Tenn. 1964).
34. Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958).
35. In the instant case the attack on the claim of the foreign corporation's creditor
status seems to have encompassed both that corporation's rights to security and its claim
for the excess above its security in bankruptcy proceedings. The court seems not to
have finally determined the rights to the foreign corporation's status to the lien or
security interest which it asserted (to which choice of law issues somewhat analogous
to those involved in the allowance of the claim and discussed in the text might be
relevant) but merely to have determined that its claims in excess of the realizable value
of the security were not to be barred solely because of its failure to qualify as a
foreign corporation.
36. 332 F.2d at 650.

37. Ibid.
38. The court cited in support of its conclusions Lloyd Thomas Co. v. Grosvenor, 144
Tenn. 347, 233 S.W. 669 (1921); Biggs v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 137 Tenn. 598, 189
S.W. 174 (1917); Cunnyngham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S.W. 1147 (1916); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Draper, 103 Tenn. 262, 52 S.W. 879 (1899). The Biggs case treated the
question of whether the contracts of unqualified foreign corporations are void or
voidable only in dictum.
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on the basis of Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Draper, 9 that such contracts
would be considered voidable because they could be enforced against
the foreign corporation, even though it could not enforce such
contracts.
40
The court then allowed the claim as a matter of federal law.
In deciding to allow the claim of the foreign corporation as a matter
of federal law, the court did not discuss the criteria which federal law
would establish to determine the allowability of the claim. The court also
chose not to discuss the relevance of section 70(C)41 of the Bankruptcy
Act which vests the trustee with "all defenses available to the bankrupt
as against third persons." It is possible that in deciding to allow the claim
if merely voidable, the present court thought that section 70(c) did not
permit the voiding of contract under which the bankrupt estate had
already received benefits.42 Such an analysis does not take into account
the unenforceability of the claim in the Tennessee courts despite the
retention of benefits under the contract by the debtor. Possibly the enforceability of the claim outside of Tennessee was considered determinative
by the court, since in applying section 70(c) the court may not be required to test the validity of the bankrupts or the trustee's defenses by
the law of the state in which the court is sitting.
The court also rejected 43 an Erie R.R. v. Tompkins" argument urged
by the trustee for the application of the Tennessee policy of unenforceability. It would appear that the court properly rejected the argument
based upon Erie since the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
federal law will control the allowance of claims in bankruptcy and
reorganization cases.45 Accordingly, the trustee should have presented
39. 103 Tenn. 262, 52 S.W. 879 (1899). Although the court's approach can be
criticized for making the case turn on the vagaries of judicial usage of the terms
"void" and "voidable," cf. Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1955),
without inquiring as to the Tennessee policies underlying the qualification requirement and the sanctions of unenforceability of contracts sometimes applied against
unqualified foreign corporations, the court was compelled to determine whether an
obligation existed or not under local law of which cognizance would be taken in reorganization proceedings. Accordingly, the court may have felt that an inquiry In
more depth than whether the claim asserted was characterized as void or voidable by
local law might involve the federal court in an apparent conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act's incorporation of state substantive law. E.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 70(a),(c), 52
Stat. 879-81 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
40. 332 F.2d at 650.
41. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(o)
(1958): "The trustee may have the benefit of all defenses available to the bankrupt as
against third persons, including statutes of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses;
and a waiver of such defense by the bankrupt after bankruptcy shall not bind the
trustee .... "
A prior case involving the same issues as the instant case also failed to discuss the
relevance of § 70(c). Kelly, Clover & Vale, Inc. v. Kramer, 198 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1953).
42. Cf. RESTATMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 13, illustration (1932), which contemplates
in the circumstances of the example a tendering back of benefits received as a prerequisite to the avoidance of the voidable contract there involved.
43. 332 F.2d at 650.
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946)
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the issue not whether apart from section 70(c), state or federal law shall
control the allowance of claims, but rather whether state policies ought
to be relevant in the application of federal law.46 In the circumstances
of the instant case and apart from the section 70(c) argument, it is the
author's opinion that unless the federal court could provide a means of
promoting compliance with state qualification requirements, such as allowance of the claim conditioned upon qualification, the federal court correctly
refused to apply state policies.
If the unenforceability in Tennessee courts of an obligation acquired
by an unqualified foreign corporation in the course of doing business in
Tennessee would not be removed by subsequent qualification, 47 then the
Tennessee courts, in imposing such a heavy penalty for nonqualification,
would follow a small minority of states. 48 Were the federal court to follow
such a policy and disallow the claim in reorganization proceedings, it
would be applying a punishment out of proportion to the wrong49 and not
because of a policy of the forum but because of a policy of another political
entity. 0 It would seem that only the strongest of policy reasons of the
forum5 ' should bar a creditor from recovering upon his claim for all time.52
(considering "whether allowance of [a] . . . claim would be compatible with the
policy of the Bankruptcy Act."): "In determining what claims are allowable and
how a debtor's assets shall be distributed, a bankruptcy court does not apply the
law of the state where it sits."
46. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
47. Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 92 Tenn. 587, 22 S.W. 743 (1893);
cf. Bush Bldg. Co. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Manchester, 189 Tenn. 203, 255
S.W.2d 31 (1949) (plaintiff corporation's suit on contract dismissed because of failure
to pay license fee to do business in Manchester until after work subject of contract
completed). See Note, 63 COLUM. L. BEv. 117, 128 n.73 (1963). But see Caesar
v. Capell, 83 Fed. 403, 424 (W.D. Tenn. 1897). It is hoped that the Tennessee
courts will revise the scope of the policy of unenforceability to permit subsequent
qualification to render previously contracted obligations enforceable. The contrary
rule would not only place an inordinately high penalty upon what appears to be only
a slight default, but it would require foreign corporations to construe correctly a
vague and uncertain mass of decisions at the peril of loss of their property.
48. See Note, supra note 47, at 128.
49. Compare Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 540 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting): "the amount of this punishment bears no relation to the amount
of the wrong done the State in failing to qualify and pay its taxes. The penalty thus
suffered does not go to the State, which sustained the injury, but results in unjust
enrichment of the debtor, who has suffered no injury from the creditor's default in
qualification." Accord, Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 Fed. 545, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1907).
50. Although federal courts apply the state policy of unenforceability of contracts
of unqualified foreign corporations in diversity cases, Woods v. Interstate Realty Corp.,
supra note 49, the application of that policy is grounded upon a federal policy of discouraging forum shopping by eliminating differences in outcome when identical issues
are litigated in the federal and state courts. See id. at 538. "The contrary result would
create discrimination against citizens of the State in favor of those authorized to invoke
the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Only to the extent that a choice
existed between a federal and state court reorganization proceedings would the Erie
rationale apply.
51. Prior to the Erie case, the federal courts recognized the claims of unqualified
foreign corporations although such claims were unenforceable in the courts of the
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Both traditionally and on an analysis of property, the federal court would
Tennessee unenforceability policy on
be justified in refusing effect to the
53
the ground of its punitive effect.
On the alternative assumption that Tennessee policy would bar a foreign
corporation from suing in a Tennessee court on an obligation only during

the period of non-qualification,5 4 a refusal to permit the unqualified foreign
corporation to share in reorganization proceedings would over-enforce

Tennessee policy by changing a temporary unenforceability into a perstate in which the federal court was sitting. David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile
Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), overruled as to diversity cases, Woods v. Interstate Realty
Corp., supra note 49. The cases in which such claims were recognized included bankruptcy proceedings. Cobb v. McDonald-Weist Logging Co., 278 Fed. 165 (9th Cir.

1921); Dunlop v. Mercer, 156 Fed. 545 (8th Cir. 1907). See 2 REMiNGTON, BANKRuPTcY § 1001.75 (1956); 3 CorLuma, BANKRUPTcY ff 63.07[6] (14th ed. 1964).

But see In re Montello Brick Works, 174 Fed. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1909). But cf. In re
Meyer & Judd, 1 F.2d 513, 525-26 (W.D. Tenn. 1924). A federal court has
recognized and allowed such a claim in reorganization proceedings subsequent
to the Erie case and the Woods case. In re V-I-D, Inc., 198 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1953). Since the Erie decision was limited to
federal court actions whose jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship, and
the overruling of David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club was expressly limited
to diversity cases, it would seem that the federal policy of recognizing the claims of
unqualified foreign corporations may continue in nondiversity cases. Although some
of the pre-Erie cases may be rationalized on the ground that little consideration was
given in them to the desirability of federal court deference to state policies in appropriate
circumstances, the arguments in favor of deference to state policies seem inappropriate
when applied to state policies of a purely punitive character.
52. A provable claim which is not allowed in the reorganization proceedings will be
permanently barred. Bankruptcy Act § 226, 52 Stat. 898 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 626 (1958). Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958). If the creditor could successfully urge in a later proceeding
that his claim had not been provable or that it had not been based upon an existing
"debt" on a theory which would equate unenforceability of the debt with its nonexistence, a failure of the claim to be allowed in the instant reorganization proceedings
would not necessarily involve a permanent bar to the claim if the Tennessee policy
of unenforceability were a temporary rather than a permanent one. See note 47 supra.
See Bankruptcy Act § 228, 52 Stat. 899 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 628
(1958). Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 17, 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35
(1958). Consider whether a Tennessee policy of temporary unenforceability would
support an argument that the claim was "contingent" and not provable. Bankruptcy
Act §§ 57(d), 63(a), 30 Stat. 560, 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 93, 104
(1958).
53. See note 49 supra. It would seem to the author that generally a decision of a
forum to apply a policy of another jurisdiction ought principally to be governed by a
criterion of fairness to the parties. Such criterion would largely avoid the imposition of
a punitive policy of another jurisdiction upon one of the parties solely because of
deference to such other jurisdiction. Something of this notion may underlie the traditional concept that the "penal" laws of one jurisdiction will not be enforced by
another jurisdiction. Cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825); See notes 49 & 51
supra.
54. This is the policy of most states which have statutes governing the question
of an unqualified foreign corporation to sue in their courts. See Note, supra note
47, at 125.
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manent unenforceability.55 The reasons set forth in the preceding paragraph for not enforcing Tennessee policy in a reorganization would apply
a fortiori to preclude over-enforcement of that policy.
A possible recognition of Tennessee interests which would avoid the
purely punitive effect of a disallowance in the reorganization proceedings
would be reached if the reorganization court were to allow the claim of the
foreign corporation on condition that it qualify or undertake to qualify.
Another reconciliation of the interests of Tennessee with the interests
of the foreign corporation would be to permit the foreign corporation
to share in the reorganization, but withhold the distribution of the share
of the foreign corporation until the Tennessee taxing authorities are paid,
and possibly until an agent for service of process is appointed.5 6
Finally, the federal statute 57 administered by the court itself lays down
a "fair and equitable" 58 standard to govern reorganization proceedings.
In the present situation, only the non-punitive facet of state policy, i.e., the
allowance of the claim conditioned upon qualification or other assurance
of satisfaction of the qualification duties, would avoid conflict with the
duty of the federal court to distribute the interests in the reorganized
corporation among its creditors and security holders on the basis of fairness and equity.
In Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp.,5 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal by the United States
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee of a declaratory judgment and
injunction suit directed against the recapitalization of a Delaware corporation which would change outstanding class A stock into debentures. The
plaintiffs based their claim for relief upon allegedly misleading statements
in notices of a proposed stockholders' meeting sent to the class A stockholders, and also upon the misleading effect that a failure to pay dividends
upon the class A stock allegedly had upon the holders of such stock.
The corporation defended upon the ground that it was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts. The Sixth Circuit had earlier affirmed
the dismissal of the action in 1963.60 At that time service had been made
upon a Chattanooga broker who had advised with respect to the recapitali55. The permanent unenforceability results from the finality of the reorganization
proceedings. See note 52 supra.
56. The qualification requirement is designed to insure that a current copy of the
corporate charter of the foreign corporation is on file with the Secretary of State, TENN.
CODE Aix. §§ 48-902, -905, -910, 48-911 (Supp. 1964), and to insure the collection
of taxes and fees. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-917, -922 (Supp. 1964). Since the
Tennessee statutes, however, provide a method for subjecting an unqualified foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-923
(Supp. 1964), it would seem that the only real interest that Tennessee has in requiring qualification (apart from insuring that a current copy of its charter is on
file with the Secretary of State) lies in the collection of taxes.
57. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 10, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676
(1958).
58. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 52 Stat. 890 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
621(2) (1958).
59. 337 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1964).
60. 318 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1963).

1080

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 18

zation and aided in soliciting approval of the change during stockholders'
meetings in Chattanooga; when service upon such broker was set aside,61
service was made upon the Tennessee Secretary of State and upon one
of the defendant's directors who resided in Tennessee. 62 In the 1963
opinion, the court held that even though the stockholders' meeting at
which the allegedly wrongful recapitalization took place occurred in
Chattanooga, the corporation was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Tennessee courts because it was not "doing business" in Tennessee 3 The
"doing business" definition embodied in section 20-2206 was adverted
to by the court,65 but was not satisfactorily handled by it. That part of
the definition which refers to a foreign corporation "having any transaction
with persons, or having any transaction concerning property situated in
this state,"6 the court improperly paraphrased when it stated that jurisdic-

tion would exist "if the foreign corporation appears to have committed or
threatened some serious damage to person or property."67 The court thus
changed the phrase "transactions with persons . . .situated in this state"
into a phrase relating to the commission or the threat of damage to the
person. The judicial paraphrase appears to have a different connotation
from the statutory original.
Although the court stated that "the alleged tortious conduct on the
part of the defendant corporation does not, in and of itself afford a basis
of jurisdiction under the Tennessee law,"68 it would be hard to see why
tortious conduct 69 in connection with "a transaction involving persons . . .
61. The district court found that "the broker was not a proper person upon whom
service could be had in order to acquire jurisdiction of the defendant corporation."
318 F.2d at 448. In setting aside service on the broker, the court seems to have
ruled that service was upon a person not authorized to receive it. See TENN. CODz
ANx. § 20-221 (1956). Compare TENx. CODE ANN. §§ 20-217, -218 (1955).
62. Although service on the director may have constituted an attempt to act under
§§ 20-221, -217, or -218, the attempt to serve the corporation by service on the
Secretary of State would seem to have constituted an attempt to act under TENN. CoDE
ANN.§ 48-923 (Supp. 1964).
63. 318 F.2d at 449.
64. Section 20-220 of the Tennessee Code provides as follows:
"Foreign corporations subject to actions.-Any corporation claiming existence under
the laws of the United States or any other state, or of any country foreign to the
United States, or any business trust found doing business in this state, shall be
subject to suit here to the same extent that corporations of this state are by the
laws thereof liable to be sued, so far as relates to any transaction had, in whole or
in part, within this state, or any cause of action arising here, but not otherwise,
Any such corporation or trust having any transaction with persons, or having any
transaction concerning any property situated in this state, through any agency whatever, acting for it within the state, shall be held to be doing business here within the
meaning of this section."
The last sentence of § 20-220 contains the definition of "doing business" applicable
to that section.
65. 318 F.2d at 448-49.
66. See note 64 supra.
67. 318 F.2d at 449.
68. Id. at 449-50.
69. It might be noted that TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1644(b) (1955), appears to make
unlawful in connection with a recapitalization "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud"
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situated in this state" 70 which is the basis of the plantiff's claim for relief

would not satisfy the literal language of section 20-220, except for a
judicial gloss on that section which may have imposed upon it a judicially
to the statutory "doing
evolved "doing business" requirement in addition 71
business" requirement contained in that section.
Although the court did not discuss the relationship between the statutory
and the judicial "doing business" requirement 72 with great clarity, it did
consider the most recent Tennessee jurisdictional cases.73 The court, in
its 1963 opinion, concluded that although the Tennessee courts had been
"in step with the trend toward expanding the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations," 74 Tennessee had not yet broadened
the scope of its jurisdictional assertion to the full extent permissible under
the federal Constitution and under the prevailing construction of the
Tennessee jurisdictional statutes, the defendant would not be subject to
Tennessee jurisdiction.
In the instant case, intervening plaintiffs sought the retention of the case
in the United States Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee on the
basis of section 48-92375 of the Tennessee Code Annotated which provides
for substituted service on the Secretary of State for corporations "doing
business" within Tennessee which have not qualified to do business here.
In dismissing the intervenors' contention summarily, the court stated that
the jurisdictional issue had already been dealt with in the prior opinion.7 6
In so holding, the court evidenced the understanding that in the circumstances of this case the "doing business" concept under section 48-923
requires at least the same amount of activity77 as the "doing business"
concept which is applicable to section 20-220.
and "any act, practice, transaction or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser or seller." Although § 48-1644(b) is
limited in its application to any offer to sell or to buy securities or any sale or
purchase of securities, those of such terms which relate to the sale side of transactions
are broadly defined. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1602(f) & (h). Recapitalizations which
are exempted from most of the provisions of the Tennessee Securities Law, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-1632(B), are not exempted from § 48-1644(B).
70. TiN. CODE ANN.§ 20-220 (1955). See note 64 supra.
71. See Gifford, Corporations-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REV. 685, 693
n.44 (1963).
72. The Tennessee courts seem to have read into the Tennessee statutes governing
jurisdiction over foreign corporations a "doing business" requirement which is somewhat more strict than that which would be imposed by the federal constitution. Id.
at 685-95.
73. The court considered Shuler v. Wood, 198 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Tenn. 1961);
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Oritz, 361 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962); Fisher
v. Trion, Inc., 49 Tenn. App. 182, 353 S.W.2d 406 (E.C. 1961); Tucker v. International
Salt Co., 209 Tenn. 95, 349 S.W.2d 541 (1961). The court also relied upon Denson
v. Webb, 23 Tenn. App. 599, 136 S.W.2d 59 (W.S. 1938).
74. 318 F.2d at 449. The court perhaps over liberally described the content of
the Tennessee "doing business" requirement heretofore existing by stating that "this
test appears satisfied when the minimal contacts making it fair and reasonable to,
exercise judicial power are established."
75. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-923 (Supp. 1964).
76. 337 F.2d at 951.
77. Compare text accompanying note 72 supra. It would seem that § 20-220 ought to
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The instant case is another example 78 of a dispute concerning the
reach of Tennessee law in relation to foreign corporations having transactions with Tennessee residents or having other contacts with Tennessee. 0
Most of the statutes antedating the 1965 session of the legislature which
regulate jurisdiction over foreign corporations were enacted long prior
to the InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,80 opinion in which the United
States Supreme Court broadened the scope of state power over foreign
corporations. The Tennessee courts accordingly have had little direction
from the legislature with respect to the criteria they should employ in
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations in
situations in which the governing legislation may have been phrased in
restrictive terms only because of pre-International Shoe constitutional
limitations on state power or in which the governing legislation, as in the
case of section 20-220, is broadly phrased, but perhaps due to such preInternational Shoe constitutional conceptions, the Tennessee courts may
have construed the statute more narrowly than their language would
justify. The Tennessee courts, as pointed out in the 1963 Smartt opinion,81
have been in the process of broadening the scope of their jurisdiction, but
they may have felt reluctant to increase the scope of their jurisdiction to the
full extent permissible under the new prevailing International Shoe test
without legislative approval.
Chapter 67 of the Public Acts of 19658 is a legislative attempt to solve
have a greater reach than § 48-923 since § 20-220 applies only to causes of action
having a nexus with Tennessee. Compare McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), with Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). To the extent that
the judicially originated "doing business" requirement is read into both sections,
however, § 20-220 may be prevented from having that greater reach. It might be
noted that some judicial limitation on the literal language of § 20-220 may be required,
however, since the language of that section relating to a cause of action arising in
Tennessee might in some circumstances extend the jurisdiction of the Tennessee
courts beyond that permissible under the prevailing liberal federal constitutional
standards. Although the court in its instant opinion, however, referred to TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-923 as "newly cited," 337 F.2d at 951, § 48-923 may have been involved
in service on the Secretary of State referred to in the court's earlier opinion.
78. See the authorities cited in note 14 supra; Morgan & Handler, Procedure &
Evidence-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 V"D. L. REv. 921, 933-35 (1962); Gifford,
supra note 71, at 685-95.
79. TENN. CODE ANN. 48-923 (repl. vol. 1964), which was adopted by the legislature
as § 1 of chapter 237 of the Public Acts of 1955 is an exception, but § 48-923 seems
to incorporate by reference the "engage in business" provisions of the qualification
statutes, enacted in 1929. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-901 (Supp. 1964). Tenn. Pub. Acts
1929. ch. 13, § 31.
80. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
81. See note 74 supra, and accompanying text.
82. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1965, ch. 67, §§ 1-7, provides as follows:
SECnON 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, That
persons who are non-residents of Tennessee and residents of Tennessee who are outside
the State and cannot be personally served with process within the State are subject to
the jurisdiction of the Courts of this State as to any action or claim for relief arising
from:
(a) The transaction of any business within the State;
(b) Any tortious act or omission within this State;

1965]

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

1083

the jurisdictional problems with which the courts have been struggling
since the InternationalShoe decision. It embodies the "long ann" approach
(c) The ow-nership or possession of any interest in property located within this State;
(d) Entering into any contract of insurance, indemnity, or guaranty covering any
person, property, or risk located within this State at the time of contracting;
(e) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be
furnished in this State.
"Person" as used herein shall include corporations and all other entities which would
lie subject to service or process if present in this State. Any such person shall be
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of this State who acts in the manner
above described through an agent or personal representative.
. SE of 2. Be it further enacted, That service of such process shall be made by
lodging (br plaintiff or his attorney) the original summons and a copy certified by the
clerk of the court in which action is brought, with a fee of Two Dollars ($2.00), with
the Secretary of State, who shall promptly send, postage prepaid, the certified copy by
registered return receipt mail to the defendant, along with a written notice that
service was so made. In case it shall appear, either before or after the lodging of
process as above provided that such non-resident is dead, then either original or
alias process may issue hereunder directed to the personal representative of such nonresident deceased and shall be sent as herein provided to the probate court of the
county and state of the residence of the deceased at the time of his death. No
appearance need be made nor shall judgment be taken against such personal representative until the lapse of sixty (60) days from the date of mailing the process
herein to such probate court. The procedure for mailing such process and proof of
service thereof shall be as provided in this section in the next succeeding section hereof
for the service upon living persons. The fee of Two Dollars ($2.00) so paid by
plaintiff, when fact of payment is endorsed on the original process by the Secretary
of State, shall be taxed as plaintiffs cost, to abide the judgment.
In case delivery of said process so made by registered mail be refused by the
addressee thereof, such refusal to be evidenced by appropriate notation of such fact
by the postal authorities, such refusal shall be deemed the equivalent of delivery and
adequately constitutes service.
SEcTnoN 3. Be it further enacted, That the original process, endorsed as below, an
affidavit of the Secretary of State setting forth his compliance with the requirements
of the preceding section, and the return-receipt signed by, or duly in behalf of, the
defendant, shall be attached together and sent to and filed by said clerk. There shall
be endorsed on the original proess by the Secretary of State over his signature
the date of his mailing the certified copy to the defendant and the date on which
he received the return-receipt of the defendant; thereupon service on the defendant
shall be consummate. An act of a deputy or regular assistant of the Secretary of State
in his behalf, hereunder, shall be deemed the equivalent of the act of the latter.
SECTION 4. Be it further enacted, That in addition to service of process on the
Secretary of State as hereinbefore set forth, personal service of process may be made
upon any party outside the state by any person over twenty-one years of age and
not a party to the action. No order of court shall be required to constitute such
person a proper officer to receive and execute the process. An affidavit of the
person serving the process shall be filed with the Clerk of the court in which the action
is pending, stating the time, manner and place of service.
SEcT=ON 5. Be it further enacted, That only causes of action arising hereafter or
heretofore from past or future transactions as set forth in Section 1 hereof may be
asserted against the defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based
upon this law.
SECTION 6. Be it further enacted, That nothing herein contained shall limit or .affect
the service of process in any other manner now provided by law. This law is in the
nature of remedial legislation and it is the legislative intent that it be given a liberal
construction.
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to jurisdiction illustrated by the McGee v. InternationalLife Ins. Co. case,
and will perform the functions which section 20-220 has heretofore failed
to perform.
In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Hooper,8 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Middle Section of Tennessee reversed a tort judgment rendered by the
Circuit Court of Davidson County against a defendant foreign corporation
on the ground of improper venue. The basis for the decision was section
20-4018 which provides that in the case of a transitory action in which
both the plaintiff and the defendant "reside" in the same county, the action
must be tried in such county. In so holding, the court relied upon and
followed 85 McClearen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,86 in
which suit was required to be tried in the county in which the cause of
action arose8 7 in which the plaintiff resided and in which the defendant
foreign corporation maintained an agent upon whom service could be made.
Some confusion seems to have existed about the application of section
20-401 to corporations. This confusion seems to have resulted from the
fact that the mandatory venue requirement of section 20-401 depends
upon where the parties "reside." Since prior decisions have held that a
domestic corporation does not "reside" in any county other than the
county in which its principal office is located,88 section 20-401 applies to
a domestic corporation only if the opposing party resides in the county
in which the corporation's principal office is located. Accordingly, a
domestic corporation, in any case in which the plaintiff resides in any
county other than the one in which such corporation's principal office is
located, may be sued in any county in which it maintains an office or
agent.3 9 Since a foreign corporation has been held to have no "principar
office in the state9 -and since the courts have equated "principal" office
with residence in the case of domestic corporations 9 1-it would appear
under the reasoning applied to domestic corporations, that section 20-401
would have no application to foreign corporations and that such corporations could be sued in any county in which they maintained an office or
agent. Such has not been the case, however.
83. 375 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1963).
84. TmN. CoDE ANx. 20-401 (1955), Transitory actions.-"In all transitory actions,
the right of action follows the person of the defendant, unless otherwise expressly

provided. If the plaintiff and defendant both reside in the same county, such action
shall be brought in the county of their residence."
85. 375 S.W.2d at 872.

86. 168 Tenn.268, 77 S.W.2d 451 (1935).
87. Although § 20-401 does not mention the factor of the location of the accrual
of the cause of action, the court seemed to consider that factor important. See note 88
infra.
88. Skaggs v Tenn. Cent. Ry., 193 Tenn. 384, 246 S.W.2d 55 (1952); cf. Toppins

v. East Tenn., V. & G.R.R., 73 Tenn. 600 (1880). The Skaggs opinion may have contained a hint that a domestic corporation has no residence for § 20-401 purposes in
the language which stated that the defendant domestic corporation "if it has a residence, is a resident of Davidson County." 246 S.W.2d at 56. (Emphasis added.)
89. Skaggs v. Tennessee Cent. Ry., supra note 88.

9o. ibid.
91. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
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In the McClearen case, a foreign corporation successfully urged the
application of the predecessor of section 20-401 to requir6 trial in the
county in which the cause of action arose,92 in which the plaintiff and an
individual defendant resided, and in which the defendant foreign corporation maintained an agent upon whom service could be made. 93 Subsequently in Tims v. Carter,9 4 the court announced the position that "where

the plaintiff and a material defendant or defendants reside in the same
county, this county being the county where the cause of action accrued,
that then the county of the residence of these parties should be the county
of action for venue purposes."95 Since McClearen could be construed to
fall within the broad principal announced in Tims, i.e., that section 20-401
would apply to a defendant not a resident of the county where the

plaintiff resided and the cause of action accrued if another "material

defendant" was such a resident,9 6 it was not clear at the time of the

institution of the present suit that a foreign corporation would be held to
"reside" for purposes of section 20-401 in any county in which it maintained

an officer or agent.
The instant case would seem to clarify the effect of section 20-401 upon
venue over foreign corporations since it applied that section to litigation

involving a single defendant foreign corporation. Henceforth, the bar
probably will understand that a foreign corporation "resides" for purposes
of section 20-401 in every county in which it has an agent for service of
92. Although a number of decisions have applied § 20-401 on a rationale which
includes conveniences of witnesses, e.g., Tims v. Carter, 192 Tenn. 386, 241 S.W.2d
501 (1951); McClearen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 168 Tenn. 268, 77 S.W.2d
451 (1935); Haynes v. Woods, 151 Tenn. 163, 268 S.W. 632 (1925); cf. Denny v.
Webb, 199 Tenn. 39, 281 S.W.2d 698 (1955), § 20-401 does not mention witnesses or
the place where the cause of action arose. The most convenient place for trial would
often be the place where the cause of action arose if the witnesses lived there, cf.
Thomas v. Altshelter, 235 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn. 1951), regardless of the residences
of the plaintiff and defendant.
93. The opinion is not clear as to whether the court is holding that § 20-401 applies
because the maintenance of an agent in the county of the plaintiff's residence is
equivalent to residence by the defendant foreign corporation for purposes of § 20-401
venue, or whether § 20-401 applies because an individual co-defendant resided in the
county of the plaintiff's residence. The opinion contains some suggestion that the trial
judge may have thought that the defendant foreign corporation resided in the county
of residence of the plaintiff and co-defendant. The supreme court then stated:
"Every circumstance required to fix the locality of trial in Lewis County is shown
by the facts stated in the plea. Sections 8641 and 8751 of the Code require that
an action shall be abated, if challenged by plea in abatement, when the plaintiff and
the defendant both reside, at the time when the suit is brought, in the same county.
Those sections and § 8643 of the Code, authorizing service upon local corporate
agents, very definitely fix the venue in Lewis County. As said in Haynes v. Wood,
supra note 92: "sections 8640, 8641 and 8751 of the Code evince the legislative
purpose to localize such transitory actions to the county where the action arose and
where plaintiff and defendant both reside. The object of that provision being for
the convenience of both litigants and witnesses." 375 S.W.2d at 872.
94. 192 Tenn. 386, 241 S.W.2d 501 (1951).
95. Id. at 388, 241 S.W.2d at 503.
96. This seems to be the basis on which both the McClearen and Tian opinions were
distinguished in Skaggs. 246 S.W.2d at 56.
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process while a domestic corporation does not so reside.97
In Gallagher v. Butler,98 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the
taxability of distributions in liquidation 9 and distributions in redemption
of a shareholder's interest'0° in a corporation. Apparently, 1' 1 because the
transactions dealt with by the court had occurred prior to the 1963
amendments 10 2 to section 67-2609 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, the
court construed that section in its unamended form. 03 The court held that
distributions in liquidation and redemption were not taxable because the
general provision imposing taxes in chapter 26 of title 67 in section 67-2602
which provides that a tax "shall be levied and collected on incomes derived
The court held that the language of
by way of dividends from stocks...
section 67-2602104 limiting the tax to incomes derived by way of "dividends"
in effect modified the broader language of section 67-2609 relating to the
10 5
taxation of "earned surplus" when and in whatever manner distributed."
97. It appears that a foreign corporation not maintaining an office in the state nor an
agent to receive service of process other than a designated state official will be deemed
to have an agent for service of process in every county of the state, and, accordingly,
will be suable in any such county under TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-405 (1955). Cartmell
v. Mechanics' Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 498, 71 S.W.2d 688 (1934). Logically, such a view
combined with the approach to residence of a foreign corporation taken in the instant
case would limit the county in which such foreign corporation was suable to the
county of the plaintiff's residence, at least if such corporation were the only defendant.
This appears to be the approach of the Tennessee courts with respect to nonresidents
sued under the nonresident motor vehicle law. TnNr. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (1955).
In such actions, a nonresident is deemed for venue purposes to be a resident of the
plaintiff's county of residence. See Carter v. Schackne, 173 Tenn. 44, 114 S.W.2d
787 (1938). It is not clear, however, that service on a statutory agent will cause a
foreign corporation to be deemed a resident of the plaintiff's county of residence in
all cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Co., 181 Tenn. 293, 181 S.W.2d
148 (1944) (workmen's compensation case). Note also the dictum in the McClearen
case, 168 Tenn. at 271, 77 S.W.2d at 452.
98. 378 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1964).
99. Coolidge v. MacFarland; French v. King; Chapin v. Butler, and First Am.
Nat'l Bank v. Butler were consolidated with the principal case.
100. Gallagher v. Butler, supra note 98; First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Butler, supra
note.
101. The opinion does not provide information with respect to the dates of all of
the allegedly taxable events.
102. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2609 (Supp. 1964).
103. 378 S.W.2d at 164.
104: Section 67-2602 provides as follows:
"Income taxable-General rate.-For each calendar year, to be computed from
January 1st to January 1st of each year, an income tax in the amount of six per cent
(6%) per annum (except as provided in § 67-2603), shall be levied and collected on
incomes derived by way of dividends from stocks or by way of interest on bonds of
each person, partnership, association, trust and corporation in the State of Tennessee
who received, or to whom accrued, or to whom was credited during any year income
from the sources above enumerated except as hereafter provided."
105. The court also relied in part upon prior administrative construction of the
statute. 378 S.W.2d at 166. Reference to 'prior administrative construction is often
useful to a court in preventing an administrative body from discriminating against
a person by treating him differently from others. In such a case the court can
reqtuire the administrative "ody to acdord equal treatment by requiring it to follow
the same construction of the statute it is administering in the case before it as in
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Since the significance of the instant decision can be appreciated best by
a reference to the statutory provisions dealt with by the court, it may be
appropriate to set out here section 67-2609 in its original form. As originally
worded, section 67-2609 provided that:
No distribution of capital
shall be taxed as income;
capital, and shall be taxed
be distributed, irrespective

by stock dividend, or liquidation or otherwise,
but earned surplus shall not be considered as
as income when and in whatever manner it may
of when it was earned.

It is apparent that an understanding of the application of former section
67-2609 requires an understanding of the meaning of the word "capital'
as there used. Specifically, it is necessary to determine whether the terms
"stock dividends" and "liquidation" as there used to describe certain distributions have a broader meaning than the phrase "distribution of capital"
as there used. Thus, the phraseology of that provision may have been intended to convey the meaning that all stock dividends or all distributions
in liquidation were distributions of capital and therefore exempt from
tax, or it may have been intended to mean that some distributions by stock
dividend or in liquidation were not "capitar' distributions and therefore
taxable either on the general ground that such distributions constituted
"income" or on the more specific ground that such distributions, in some
cases, might be deemed distributions of "earned surplus."
Lawrence v. MacFarland,10 6 gave a partial answer to the foregoing question by holding that in some circumstances a stock dividend could have
a broader meaning than the phrase "distribution of capital." That case
held that a "stock dividend" of an investment company with respect to
which the shareholders had the option 10 7 of accepting cash or the stock
distribution was a distribution of "earned surplus" and therefore taxable.
The legislature responded to the Lawrence v. MacFarland decision by
amending'0 8 section 67-2609 to read as follows:
former cases. In the instant case, the taxing authorities may not have attempted
to treat particular taxpayers in a discriminatorily adverse way, but rather they may
have attempted a major shift in policy applicable to all taxpayers. Compare Bates &
Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106 (1904). The court may have used prior administrative construction in the instant case, however, because the court felt that a change
in tax policy as applied to the instant taxpayer might have embodied a certain amount
of frustration of the taxpayers' justified reliance upon such prior administrative construction. If so, the opinion may indicate the desirability for methods of informing
the public about prospective changes in tax policy which would avoid the prospect
of frustrating justified reliance and would also avoid freezing tax policy into preexisting modes by judicial restatement of administrative practice in terms of statutory
construction. Cf. Gifford, Administrative Law Study, 150 (TENN. LAW RExvsiox
COMM'N 1964).
106. 209 Tenn. 376, 354 S.W.2d 78 (1962), commented upon in Hartman, State
and Local Taxation-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 865, 874-77 (1963).
107. The option in each shareholder to accept cash in lieu of the stock distribution
would appear to support the taxability of the transaction. Compare INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 305(b)(2). Cf. 43 ARB, ch. 7,
3(d), which excepts from the general
conclusion that a stock dividend does not result in income to the recipient, the situation in which "each shareholder is given an election to receive cash or shares."
108. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1963, ch. 273, 83d Gen. Assembly.

1088

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL, 18

67-2609. Distributions of capital exempt.-No distribution of capital shall be
taxed as income under this chapter, and no distribution of surplus by way of
stock dividend shall be taxable in the year such distribution is made; but all
other distributions out of earned surplus shall be taxed as income when
and in whatever manner made, irrespective of when such surplus was earned.
Provided, however, that stock dividends issued within one (1) year of
liquidation shall be taxable in the year received to the extent made out of
earned surplus; and further provided that gains over and above the par
or original pro rata capital value of original shares held shall be taxed to
the shareholder upon any transfer of stock to nonresidents in the year of
such transfer, when such transfer occurs within one (1) year prior to
liquidation or redemption. There shall, however, be exempt from taxation
under the provision of this section, distribution made pursuant to decrees
ordering divestiture of stock in enforcement of anti-trust statutes.
The amended section retains the exemption from taxation for capital
distributions, but enlarges or clarifies the stock distribution exemption from
applying only to a distribution of capital by way of stock dividend to
include an exemption from tax in the year in which the distribution is
made covering all distributions of surplus'09 by way of stock dividend.
Such stock dividend exemption would now apparently include distributions "by way of stock dividends" which capitalized earned surplus, and,
accordingly, would reverse in that connection the decisional law made
by Lawrence v. MacFarland despite the fact that in that case the distribution probably represented a capitalization of earned surplus." 0
It will be noted, however, that the amended section exempts a stock
dividend from taxation "in the year such distribution is made." Apart
from the narrow language of section 67-2602, an inference, accordingly,
would exist that such a distribution might be taxable in some other year.
This inference is reinforced by the proviso that all gains over the par value
of the stock shall be taxed if transferred by a resident to a nonresident
within one year from liquidation. The apparent reason for such a provision
would seem to be that the legislature considered that such a transfer
would likely be an attempt to avoid the tax otherwise payable by a
resident upon liquidation of the corporation. That is to say the assumption
underlying the wording of the amended section 67-2609 is that upon
liquidation of a corporation the gain over "the par or original pro rata
capital value of original shares" in such corporation would be taxed. Such
an analysis would also apply to the "redemption" of stock. Since the legislature opposed redemption to liquidation in the second proviso, it appears
that redemption probably was thought to mean something other than
liquidation. Redemption, accordingly, would seem to include payment
in cancellation of stock and would include the case of payments in divestiture of a stockholder interest. Accordingly, under the above analysis,
109. As worded the exemption would include not only stock dividends representing
"capital surplus" or "reduction surplus" or other "non-earned" surplus, but would include stock dividends representing earned surplus.
110. TEu. CODE ANN. § 48-211 (1955), provides that the surplus of a corporation
issuing a stock dividend shall be reduced in an amount equal to the fair value of the
stock issued as a dividend.
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taken by itself,"' the amended section 67-2602 would contain inferences
that the liquidation payments and the payments in divestiture of stockholder interests involved in the present case would be taxable. The antitrust decree exemption"

2

re-enforces the foregoing conclusions, since the

antitrust decree exemption would be largely unnecessary if distributions in
eliminations of stockholder interests or in liquidations were nontaxable.
It should be pointed out that the first clause of the proviso appears somewhat inconsistent with an assumption that earned surplus will be taxed upon
liquidation or redemption. If such tax will be imposed within one year

from a stock distribution, then the legislative purpose in carving out the
one year period preceding liquidation from a general exemption from tax
is unclear. The legislative purpose would be more clear, however, on the
assumption that a stock dividend results in a capitalization of earnings in
such a way that upon liquidation or redemption, the distribution of such
capitalized earnings would be exempted from taxation as distributions of
"capital." Such a reading of the statute would be premised partly on
a
legislative policy to exempt from taxation earnings reinvested in Tennessee, 1 3 and upon the judgment that earnings made within one year from
liquidation could not be effectively invested in Tennessee and accordingly
ought not to be allowed to escape taxation by capitalization through the
stock dividend route.
Such an analysis has a superficial attraction. "Capital' is defined in
section 48-201" 4 "for the purpose of beginning business, and for all other
purposes" to mean the "aggregate par value" of all par value shares or the
aggregate consideration received as consideration for no-par value shares
(less any amounts the directors allocate to surplus) plus such amounts as
the directors allocate to capital by resolution. Section 48-211115 permits the
111. That is, not in pari materia with TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2602 (1955).
112. The antitrust decree exemption was added by a separate amendment. Tenn.
Pub. Acts 1963, ch. 167, § 1.
113. Such a policy appears elsewhere in title 67. E.g., TENN. CODE Aws. § 67-502(2)
(1955).
114. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201 (1955): "'Capital" defined-Paid in surplus on no
par shares.-The capital of every corporation to which chapters 1 to 5, inclusive, of this
title are made applicable, for the purpose of beginning business, and for all other purposes, shall be defined as the sum of the aggregate par value of all shares of stock having
par value issued by the corporation and/or the aggregate amount of consideration
received by the corporation for the issuance of shares without par value, together with
such additional amounts, if any, as from time to time by resolution of the board of
directors may be transferred to capital; provided, however, that any corporation may,
by resolution of its board of directors, allocate to surplus, in lieu of capital, the amount
of value of any part of the consideration received for the issuance of shares without par
value."

115. It might be noted here that the court attempted to relate § 48-211 to former
§ 67-2609 by making the following statement:
"Section 67-2609 states in plain language that distribution of capital by stock dividends, liquidation or otherwise, shall not be taxed as income. The understanding of
this sentence is plain and presents no problem. As a matter of fact, if it provided
otherwise it would be in conflict with T.C.A. § 48-211, which states that dividends may
be paid to stockholders from a corporation's net earnings or from the surplus of its
assets over its liabilities, including capital but not otherwise. The directors of a
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issuance of stock dividends if an amount of surplus equal to the fair value
of the stock distributed as a dividend is transferred to capital. If the
"capital" exemption in section 67-2609 has the same meaning as "capital"
has in title 48, it would be possible for a continual process of capitalizing
earnings to occur either through the issuance of stock dividends or througli
director resolution with the result that the section 67-2609 "capital" exemption upon liquidation would grow with the earnings of the corporation and
upon such liquidation no tax would be payable from that part of retained
earnings which had been capitalized.
Such an analysis, however, neglects the fact that the definition of
"capital" in section 48-201 was probably made with reference to facets of
corporate financial structure only in mind. Moreover, from a policy standpoint,nla

postponement of taxation on earnings during the period while

they are committed to reinvestment in Tennessee seems more justifiable
than a total exemption from tax at the shareholder level, including liquidation and redemption-transactions which are compatible with removal of

earnings from use within Tennessee.
The postponement of tax for retained earnings approach, however, may
furnish the assumption underlying the first clause of the proviso. It may
be that the legislature determined that stock dividends should be exempted
from tax in order to encourage reinvestment of earnings necessarily resulting from the capitalization of earned surplus required in conjunction
with such a stock dividend, but determined that since meaningful reinvestment could not occur within one year from liquidation, no purpose was
served in according such an exemption to stock dividends occurring within
the year preceding liquidation.
Although the opinion did not mention the effect of the legislative amendments to section 67-2609 in 1963, the court may have felt that its reliance
upon the narrowly worded provisions of section 67-2602 would preclude
any argument that the legislative changes in section 67-2609 would make
distributions in liquidation or in redemption of stockholder interests
taxable. The controlling effect of the by-way-of-dividends phrase of section
67-2602 may not be so apparent, however, when viewed in conjunction
with the amendments to section 67-2609. In limiting the scope of former
section 67-2609 by reading it in pad materia'1 6 with section 67-2602, the
court stated that the former section "should be read as if the words 'by
way of dividends' had been placed by the Legislature after the word
corporation may issue other common or preferred stock as dividends provided it has a
surplus equal in value." 378 S.W.2d at 165.
It is unclear exactly how the court thought § 48-211 related to § 67-2609. It is not
clear why § 67-2609 could not provide otherwise than it did without conflicting with
§ 48-211. Section 48-211 requires capitalization of surplus equal in value to the stock
distributed, but nothing in § 48-211 would conflict with either the taxability or the
non-taxability of "distributions of capital by stock dividends."
115a. In order to give due regard to reasonable expectations of taxpayers, however,
it would be best to embody such a policy determination in the form of a prospective
rule.

116. 378 S.W.2d at 164.
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'distributed." '117 The rephrasing of section 67-2609 so adopted by the
court is difficult to transpose to the amended version of section 67-2609,
however. If the limiting by-way-of-dividends language is carried over to
the new section 67-2609, the inference of ultimate taxability of earned
surplus on liquidation or redemption raised by the limitations of the
exemption from taxation of stock dividends to the year such distributions
are made,118 and the inference of taxability of liquidation or redemption
payments to a Tennessee resident raised by the provisions of the second
clause of the proviso 19 are not readily reconcilable with the section
67-2602 language so carried over.
117. Id. at 165.
118. See text following note 110 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.

